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Abstract
We consider various curious features of general relativity, and relativistic field theory, in
two spacetime dimensions. In particular, we discuss: the vanishing of the Einstein tensor;
the failure of an initial-value formulation for vacuum spacetimes; the status of singularity
theorems; the non-existence of a Newtonian limit; the status of the cosmological constant;
and the character of matter fields, including perfect fluids and electromagnetic fields. We
conclude with a discussion of what constrains our understanding of physics in different
dimensions.
Keywords: General relativity; two-dimensional gravity; Newtonian limit; initial value
formulation
1. Introduction
Philosophers of physics—and conceptually-oriented mathematical physicists—have gained
considerable insight into the foundations and interpretation of our best physical theories,
including general relativity, non-relativistic quantum theory, and quantum field theory, by
studying the relationships between these theories and other “nearby” theories. For instance,
one can better understand general relativity by studying its relationship to Newtonian grav-
itation, particularly in the form of geometrized Newtonian gravitation (i.e. Newton-Cartan
theory);1 or by considering its relationship to other relativistic theories of gravitation.2
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Manchak), mdschnei@uci.edu (Mike D. Schneider), weatherj@uci.edu (James Owen Weatherall)
1For background on geometrized Newtonian gravitation, see Trautman (1965) and (especially) Malament
(2012, Ch. 4). For projects that aim to use this theory to provide new insight into general relativty, see,
for instance, Cartan (1923, 1924), Friedrichs (1927), Friedman (1983), Weatherall (2014, 2011, 2017b,a),
Weatherall and Manchak (2014), Dewar and Weatherall (2017), and Ehlers (1997).
2See, for instance, Brown (2005), Knox (2011, 2013), Pitts (2016), or Weatherall (2017a).
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Likewise, formulating classical mechanics in the language of Poisson manifolds provides im-
portant resources for understanding the structure of Hilbert space and quantum theory.3
And thinking about classical field theory using nets of *-algebras on spacetime can help us
better understand quantum field theory.4
The key feature of projects of the sort just described is that they are comparative: one
draws out features of one theory by considering the ways in which it differs from other theo-
ries. But there is a closely allied project—or better, strategy for conceiving of projects—that,
though often taken up by mathematical physicists, has received considerably less attention in
the philosophy of physics literature.5 This strategy is to study the foundations of a physical
theory by considering features of that same theory in other dimensions. Doing so can provide
insight into questions concerning, for instance, whether inferences about the structure of the
world that make use of the theory in fact follow from the theory itself, or if they depend on
ancillary assumptions. For instance, (vacuum) general relativity in four dimensions is, in a
certain precise sense, deterministic. But as we argue in what follows, this feature depends
on dimensionality; in two dimensions the theory, at least on one understanding, does not
have a well-posed initial value formulation.
A detailed study of the physics of different dimensions can also reveal striking disanalogies
between physics in different dimensions, which can then inform other projects. For instance,
it is common in the mathematical physics literature to consider quantizing field theories—
including general relativity—in lower dimensions.6 Doing so can provide important hints at
what a full theory of quantum gravity, say, might look like. Moreover, there is a temptation
to try to draw preliminary philosophical morals about our own universe from these quantum
theories in lower dimensions—particularly among philosophers who prefer to work with
mathematically rigorous formulations of theories, which in the case of quantum field theories
are only available in lower dimensions. But there are also reasons to be cautious about such
hints: if classical theories, including general relativity, have very different features in different
dimensions, the inferences we can draw about their quantum counterparts in those other
dimensions may not carry over to the four dimensional case.
In what follows, we investigate the features of general relativity in two spacetime di-
mensions, on several ways of understanding what that might mean. In the first instance,
we suppose that Einstein’s equation holds in all dimensions. As we will show, the resulting
theory is strikingly different, in a number of important ways, from the standard four di-
mensional theory. Of course, that theories can differ dramatically in different dimensions is
3See, for instance, Weyl (1950) and Landsman (1998, 2017) for mathematical treatments of the main
issues; for examples of how these ideas have been applied by philosophers, see, for instance, Feintzeig (2016a)
and Feintzeig et al. (2017).
4See, for instance, Brunetti et al. (2012), Rejzner (2016), and Feintzeig (2016c,b).
5To our knowledge, the projects that come closest to this strategy are those that evaluate arguments
that spacetime must have a certain dimensionality (Callender, 2005); or those that consider the details of
constructive quantum field theory, which often considers lower-dimensional models (Ruetsche, 2011; Hancox-
Li, 2017).
6See, for instance, Glimm and Jaffe (1987); for a discussion of quantum gravity in particular, see Carlip
(2003).
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hardly news—especially to the experts in mathematical physics who work on these theories
in fewer (or more) than four dimensions—and it is well-known that general relativity in two
dimensions is “pathological” or (arguably) “trivial”. But there are some features that we
discuss below that, to our knowledge, have not been drawn out in detail in the literature—
including, for instance, the status of the initial value formulation and the non-existence of
a Newtonian limit (where Newtonian gravitation is generalized by assuming that the ge-
ometrized Poisson equation holds in all dimensions). Moreover, in our view it is valuable
to collect these features of the two-dimensional theory together in one place, and to reflect
on what they can teach us about the structure of general relativity more generally. They
also raise the question of what it means to identify theories across dimensions, particularly
when the ostensibly “same” theory can have very different qualitative features in different
dimensions.
In the next section, we will discuss the status of the Einstein tensor—which vanishes
identically in two dimensions—and Einstein’s equation (without cosmological constant). In
a sense, this is the principal feature of two-dimensional general relativity from which the
other strange features follow. In the following section, we will discuss the status of the initial
value formulation and singularity theorems in two dimensions. Next we will consider New-
tonian gravitation in two dimensions, generalized as noted above, and show that it is not the
classical limit of general relativity. In the following section, we will consider what happens
when one includes a cosmological constant, exploring the consequences for the character of
some matter fields in two dimensions. We will then discuss what it means to generalize a
theory to different dimensions, by considering various arguments about alternative formula-
tions of the theory in two dimensions. We conclude by arguing that the discussion here of
how to generalize a theory to other dimensions raises questions for a common view according
to which to interpret a physical theory is to characterize the space of possibilities allowed
by that theory.
2. Einstein’s Tensor and Einstein’s Equation
We begin with a few preliminaries concerning the relevant background formalism of general
relativity.7 An n-dimensional relativistic spacetime (for n ≥ 2) is a pair (M, gab) where
M is a smooth, connected n-dimensional manifold and gab is a smooth, non-degenerate,
pseudo-Riemannian metric of Lorentz signature (+,−, ...,−) defined on M .8
For each point p ∈M , the metric assigns a cone structure to the tangent space Mp. Any
tangent vector ξa in Mp will be timelike if gabξ
aξb > 0, null if gabξ
aξb = 0, or spacelike if
gabξ
aξb < 0. Null vectors delineate the cone structure; timelike vectors are inside the cone
while spacelike vectors are outside. A time orientable spacetime is one that has a continuous
timelike vector field on M . A time orientable spacetime allows one to distinguish between
7The reader is encouraged to consult Hawking and Ellis (1973), Wald (1984), and Malament (2012) for
details.
8We also assume M to be Hausdorff and paracompact. All objects that are candidates to be smooth in
what follows are assumed to be so, even when not mentioned explicitly.
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the future and past lobes of the light cone. In what follows, it is assumed that spacetimes
are time orientable and that an orientation has been chosen.
For some open (connected) interval I ⊆ R, a smooth curve γ : I → M is timelike if the
tangent vector ξa at each point in γ[I] is timelike. Similarly, a curve is null (respectively,
spacelike) if its tangent vector at each point is null (respectively, spacelike). A curve is causal
if its tangent vector at each point is either null or timelike. A causal curve is future directed
if its tangent vector at each point falls in or on the future lobe of the light cone. A curve
γ : I →M in a spacetime (M, gab) is a geodesic if ξa∇aξb = 0, where ξa is the tangent vector
to γ and ∇a is the unique derivative operator compatible with gab.
The fundamental dynamical principle of general relativity is known as Einstein’s equation.
In four dimensions, Einstein’s equation may be written, without cosmological constant, in
natural units as
Rab − 1
2
gabR = 8piTab. (2.1)
Here Rab = R
n
abn is the Ricci tensor associated with gab and R = R
a
a is the curvature
scalar. The left-hand side of this equation is known as the Einstein tensor, often written
Gab; the right-hand side is the sum of the energy-momentum tensors associated with all
matter present in the universe and their interactions.
In the first instance, we generalize general relativity to other dimensions by taking this
expression to relate curvature and energy-momentum in arbitrary dimensions. (We will
return to this proposal in sections 5 and 6 and consider other possibilities.) In particular,
define, in a spacetime of any dimension, the Einstein tensor to be Gab = Rab − 12gabR.
We have the following immediate proposition.
Proposition 1. Let (M, gab) be a two-dimensional spacetime. Then Rab =
1
2
Rgab and
Gab = 0.
Proof. Given a pseudo-Riemannian manifold of any dimension n ≥ 2, the Riemann tensor
Rabcd = ganR
n
bcd is antisymmetric in the first two indices and in the last two indices: Rabcd =
R[ab][cd]. It follows that Rabcd can be written as a linear combination of outer products of
two-forms. But the space of two-forms on a two-dimensional manifold is one-dimensional,
and so we have Rabcd = fabcd, where ab is either volume element on M determined by gab.
9
(Observe that f is independent of the choice, since it is the square of the volume element
that appears here; if M is non-orientable, one can proceed locally.) It follows, from standard
identities concerning volume elements, that Rab = f
n
abn = fgab, and thus R = 2f . Thus
Gab = Rab − 12Rgab = fgab − 12(2f)gab = 0.
Let us now draw out some of the consequences of Prop. 1. First, it follows, at least
on this generalization of general relativity to other dimensions, that every two-dimensional
spacetime (M, gab) is a vacuum solution to Einstein’s equation. It is tempting to conclude
from this result that there can be no matter in an two-dimensional spacetime; in fact, this
holds only if we assume that the total energy-momentum tensor vanishes only if all matter
9Compare with Wald (1984, p. 54).
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fields vanish, which is not necessarily true in two dimensions. (We return to this point in
section 5.)
Here is another consequence. Recall that in four dimensions, vacuum spacetimes always
have vanishing Ricci curvature (Rab = 0), but in general they have non-vanishing Weyl
curvature, which is defined by
Cabcd = Rabcd − 2
n− 2
(
ga[dRc]b + gb[cRd]a
)− 2
(n− 1)(n− 2)Rga[cgd]b. (2.2)
But the situation in two dimensions is strikingly different. In particular, Prop. 1 immediately
implies that being a vacuum solution in two dimensions does not imply that a spacetime has
vanishing Ricci curvature. To the contrary, all solutions with non-vanishing Ricci curvature
are vacuum solutions.10
Conversely, there is a sense in which vacuum solutions in two dimensions have vanishing
Weyl curvature. To make this idea precise requires some work. The reason is that the
definition of the Weyl tensor in Eq. (2.2) only makes sense in 3 or more dimensions. Still,
we can ask whether there is any tensor in two dimensions that might be a suitable analog
for the Weyl tensor. For instance, the Weyl tensor is defined as the “trace-free” part of the
Riemann tensor, i.e., the trace-free tensor one gets by subtracting appropriate terms linear
in the Ricci tensor and the scalar curvature. To ask if a candidate Weyl tensor is available
in two dimensions, then, we might consider tensors of the form
Cabcd = Rabcd − k
(
ga[dRc]b + gb[cRd]a
)− `Rga[cgd]b,
where k and ` are unspecified constants. We then ask: for which values of k and ` is this
quantity trace-free, in the sense that Cnabn = 0?
The first thing to observe is that since Rab =
1
2
Rgab, the terms proportional to k and
` are in fact proportional to one another. Thus, by redefining constants, it is sufficient to
consider only tensors of the form
Cabcd = Rabcd − kRga[cgd]b.
Taking the trace of both sides, we find that this will be trace-free just in case
0 = Rab +
k
2
Rgab =
R(1 + k)
2
gab,
i.e., if k = −1. A short calculation similar to the proof of Prop. 1 then yields that
Cabcd = Rabcd +Rga[cgd]b =
1
2
Rabcd − 1
2
Rabcd = 0.
We thus have a sense in which the natural candidate for a two-dimensional Weyl tensor
10One can confirm that there exist two-dimensional spacetimes with non-vanishing Ricci curvature by
direct computation; an example is offered in section 4.
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is identically zero.11 To check that this makes sense, recall that the vanishing of the Weyl
tensor in three or more dimensions is associated with a spacetime being “conformally flat”,
in the sense that, at least locally, gab = Ω
2ηab, where ηab is flat. It turns out that something
closely related holds in two dimensions: there is no non-vanishing candidate for a Weyl
tensor, and all two-dimensional spacetimes are (locally) conformally flat:12
Fact 2. Let (M, gab) be a two dimensional spacetime. Then in some neighborhood of every
point, there exists a flat metric ηab such that gab = Ω
2ηab in that neighborhood.
In sum, all two-dimensional relativistic spacetimes are vacuum solutions to Einstein’s
equation in two dimensions. Moreover, these spacetimes may be Ricci curved, but are
always conformally flat—even in the presence of non-trivial Riemann curvature. This is
precisely the opposite of what we are accustomed to in four dimensions.
3. Determinism and Singularities
We now turn to another, in many ways more substantial, set of consequences of Prop. 1.
Recall that in four dimensions, general relativity admits a well-posed initial value formulation
for vacuum solutions.13 In other words, if appropriate initial data are specified, then there
exists a unique vacuum solution that is the maximal evolution of that data. The upshot
of this result is a clear sense in which “Laplacian determinism holds” in general relativity
(Earman, 1986, p. 188).
To make this precise, we require some further preliminaries. We say two spacetimes
(M, gab) and (M
′, g′ab) are isometric if there is a diffeomorphism ϕ : M → M ′ such that
ϕ∗(gab) = g′ab. A spacetime (M, gab) is extendible if there exists a spacetime (M
′, g′ab) and
a (proper) isometric embedding ϕ : M → M ′ such that ϕ(M) ⊂ M ′. Here, the spacetime
(M ′, g′ab) is an extension of (M, gab). A spacetime is inextendible if it has no extension.
We say a curve γ : I → M is not maximal if there is another curve γ′ : I ′ → M such
that I is a proper subset of I ′ and γ(s) = γ′(s) for all s ∈ I. A spacetime (M, gab) is
geodesically complete if every maximal geodesic γ : I →M is such that I = R. A spacetime
is geodesically incomplete if it is not geodesically complete.
For any two points p, q ∈ M , we write p  q if there exists a future-directed timelike
curve from p to q. We write p < q if there exists a future-directed causal curve from p to
q. These relations allow us to define the timelike and causal pasts and futures of a point p:
I−(p) = {q : q  p}, I+(p) = {q : p  q}, J−(p) = {q : q < p}, and J+(p) = {q : p < q}.
Naturally, for any set S ⊆ M , define J+[S] to be the set ⋃{J+(x) : x ∈ S} and so on. A
set S ⊂M is achronal if S ∩ I−[S] = ∅.
11Other arguments are available to support the claim that any viable candidate for the Weyl tensor must
vanish identically. For instance, in the proof of Prop. 1, we show that Rabcd is proportional to the scalar
curvature, and thus vanishes if and only if its trace does.
12The “local” qualification is very important here, and often dropped in informal discussions. For instance,
it is a consequence of the Gauss-Bonnet theorem that there is no flat metric on the 2-sphere.
13The non-vacuum case depends crucially on the type of matter being considered (Wald, 1984, pp. 266–
267).
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A point p ∈ M is a future endpoint of a future-directed causal curve γ : I → M if, for
every neighborhood O of p, there exists a point t0 ∈ I such that γ(t) ∈ O for all t > t0.
A past endpoint is defined similarly. A causal curve is future inextendible (respectively, past
inextendible) if it has no future (respectively, past) endpoint. If an incomplete geodesic is
timelike or null, there is a useful distinction one can introduce. We say that a future-directed
causal geodesic γ : I →M without future endpoint is future incomplete if there is an r ∈ R
such that s < r for all s ∈ I. A past incomplete causal geodesic is defined analogously.
For any set S ⊆ M , we define the past domain of dependence of S, written D−(S),
to be the set of points p ∈ M such that every causal curve with past endpoint p and no
future endpoint intersects S. The future domain of dependence of S, written D+(S), is
defined analogously. The entire domain of dependence of S, written D(S), is just the set
D−(S) ∪D+(S). The edge of an achronal set S ⊂ M is the collection of points p ∈ S such
that every open neighborhood O of p contains a point q ∈ I+(p), a point r ∈ I−(p), and
a timelike curve from r to q which does not intersect S. A set S ⊂ M is a slice if it is
closed, achronal, and without edge. A spacetime (M, gab) which contains a slice S such that
D(S) = M is said to be globally hyperbolic and the set S is a Cauchy surface.
We define the future Cauchy horizon of S, denoted H+(S), as the set D+(S)−I−[D+(S)].
The past Cauchy horizon of S is defined analogously. One can verify that H+(S) and H−(S)
are closed and achronal. The Cauchy horizon of S, denoted H(S), is the set H+(S)∪H−(S).
We have H(S) = D˙(S) and therefore H(S) is closed. Also, a non-empty, closed, achronal
set S is a Cauchy surface if and only if H(S) = ∅.
Now consider the triple (Σ, hab, kab). Here, Σ is a connected manifold of dimension n−1,
hab is a Riemannian metric on Σ, and kab is a symmetric field on Σ. Let
(n−1)R be the
scalar curvature of hab and let Da be the unique derivative operator compatible with hab.
We take (Σ, hab, kab) to be a (vacuum) initial data set if the following constraint equations
are satisfied (Wald, 1984, p. 259):
(n−1)R− (k aa )2 + kabkab = 0,
Dbk
b
a −Dak bb = 0.
Let (Σ, hab, kab) be an initial data set. We call a spacetime (M, gab) a maximal Cauchy
development of (Σ, hab, kab) if it has the following properties: (i) (M, gab) is a vacuum solu-
tion to Einstein’s equation. (ii) (M, gab) is globally hyperbolic with Cauchy surface Σ. (iii)
The induced metric and extrinsic curvature of Σ are hab and kab. (iv) Every other spacetime
which satisfies (i)–(iii) can be mapped isometrically into a subset of (M, gab). Note that, by
property (iv), a maximal Cauchy development of an initial data set (Σ, hab, kab) is unique.
We can now state the following celebrated result.
Proposition 3 (Choquet-Bruhat and Geroch (1969)). Let (Σ, hab, kab) be an initial data set
with Σ three-dimensional. There exists a maximal Cauchy development of (Σ, hab, kab).
So we have a clear sense in which the state of the universe at any particular “time” can
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be used to uniquely determine the state of the universe at all other “times” if attention is
restricted to spacetimes that are four-dimensional vacuum solutions that are appropriately
maximal. Now, given that every two-dimensional spacetime is a vacuum solution, it should
not be too surprising that the above proposition does not generalize. We have the following.
Proposition 4. Let (Σ, hab, kab) be an initial data set with Σ one-dimensional. There is no
maximal Cauchy development of (Σ, hab, kab).
Proof. Let (Σ, hab, kab) be an initial data set where Σ is one-dimensional. Let us proceed
indirectly: Suppose there exists a maximal Cauchy development of (Σ, hab, kab) and let this
two-dimensional spacetime be (M, gab). Let O ⊂ M be any open set which is disjoint from
Σ ⊂ M . Consider the spacetime (M, g′ab) where g′ab = Ω2gab and Ω : M → R is a smooth,
strictly positive scalar function which is chosen so that Ω(p) = 1 for all p ∈M −O and the
spacetimes (M, gab) and (M, g
′
ab) are not isometric.
By Prop. 1 above, (M, g′ab) is a vacuum solution. Since (M, gab) is globally hyperbolic with
Cauchy surface Σ, and is conformally related to (M, g′ab), the latter spacetime is globally
hyperbolic with Cauchy surface Σ as well. Because gab = g
′
ab on M − O, the induced
metric and extrinsic curvature of Σ ⊂ M − O in the spacetime (M, g′ab) are hab and kab
respectively. Thus, by the definition of maximal Cauchy development, (M, g′ab) can be
isometrically embedded into a subset (M, gab). But this is impossible since (M, gab) and
(M, g′ab) are not isometric.
All by itself, the non-existence of maximal Cauchy developments in two-dimensional
general relativity marks another significant break from the usual four-dimensional case;
there is a kind of breakdown of determinism here that is not present in four dimensions. But
there is an interesting corollary one finds as well: without maximal Cauchy developments,
one loses an important tool commonly used to distinguish between “physically reasonable”
and “physically unreasonable” models of general relativity. Take, for example, the “cosmic
censorship conjecture” (Penrose, 1979) which is the idea that all “physically reasonable”
spacetimes are free of the “ghastly pathologies of naked singularities” (Earman, 1995, p. 66).
The physical formulation of one influential version of the conjecture is this: “All physically
reasonable spacetimes are globally hyperbolic” (Wald, 1984, p. 304).
To express the statement more precisely, we require a further definition. We will say
that a spacetime (M, gab) is strongly causal if for any point p ∈ M , and any neighborhood
O of p, there exists a neighborhood V ⊆ O of p such that no causal curve intersects V more
than once. The cosmic censorship hypothesis may then be expressed as follows (Geroch and
Horowitz, 1979; Wald, 1984).
Conjecture 5. Let (Σ, hab, kab) be an initial data set with Σ three-dimensional. If the
maximal Cauchy development of this initial data is extendible, for each p ∈ H+(Σ) in any
extension, either strong causality is violated at p or I−(p) ∩ Σ is noncompact.
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Given that maximal Cauchy developments do not exist in two dimensions, how might one
express (a version of) the cosmic censorship conjecture in a general way?
Let (K, gab) be a globally hyperbolic spacetime. Let ϕ : K → K ′ be an isometric
embedding into a spacetime (K ′, g′ab). We say (K
′, g′ab) is an effective extension of (K, gab)
if, for some Cauchy surface S in (K, gab), ϕ[K] is a proper subset of int(D(ϕ[S])) and ϕ[S]
is achronal. Hole-freeness can then be defined as follows.14 A spacetime (M, gab) is hole-free
if, for every set K ⊆ M such that (K, gab) is a globally hyperbolic spacetime with Cauchy
surface S, if (K ′, gab) is not an effective extension of (K, gab) where K ′ = int(D(S)), then
there is no effective extension of (K, gab).
With this background, Earman (1995, pp. 75–98) suggests the following formulation of
the cosmic censorship hypothesis.
Conjecture 6. Let (M, gab) be an inextendible, hole-free, vacuum solution. If S ⊂ M is a
slice and there exists a p ∈ H+(S), then either strong causality is violated at p or I−(p) ∩ S
is noncompact.
This latter conjecture is, as far as we know, still open when (M, gab) is four-dimensional.
But in fact that it is false in the two-dimensional case.
Example. Let (M, ηab) be two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime.
15 Let q be any point
in M and S ⊂ M be any slice such that q ∈ I+[S]. Let M ′ = M − {q} and consider a
smooth, strictly positive scalar field Ω : M ′ → R that approaches infinity as the “missing
point” q is approached. Now consider the spacetime (M ′, gab) where gab = Ω2ηab. Because
the conformal factor Ω blows up, it renders the spacetime (M ′, gab) geodesically complete.
It is thus hole-free and inextendible (Manchak, 2014). By Prop. 1 above, the spacetime
is a vacuum solution. Now consider any point p ∈ H+(S). We know that strong causal-
ity is not violated at p since the spacetime is stably causal (because the spacetime admits
a global time function; see Wald (1984, p. 199)) and that I−(p) ∩ S is compact. (See figure 1)
Does the above example show the two-dimensional version of the “cosmic censorship
conjecture” to be false or does it merely suggest a variant formulation of the conjecture?
This is not an easy question to pursue given the “large and diverse class of ideas and mo-
tivations” falling under the label “cosmic censorship” (Earman, 1995, p. 99). One thing
is clear, however: the example certainly demonstrates just how difficult it is to get a grip
on any characterization of “physically reasonable” two-dimensional spacetimes.16 The con-
struction of the example seems to be somewhat “artificial” and yet it is about as locally
well-behaved as one could demand—it is a vacuum solution, after all. Globally, the example
also checks all the usual boxes required of “physically reasonable” spacetimes: it is stably
14See Geroch (1977) for an earlier definition and for a discussion of why a revision was needed.
15That is, we suppose M is diffeomorphic to R2 and ηab is flat and geodesically complete.
16These difficulties in two dimensions exacerbate the problem of characterizing “physically reasonable”
spacetimes in any dimension. See Manchak (2011) for details.
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Figure 1: The set I−(p) ∩ S is compact.
causal, inextendible, and free of holes. Possibly the only count against the example is that
it is geodesically complete while the singularity theorems of Hawking and Penrose (1970)
suggest that many “physically reasonable” spacetimes are geodesically incomplete. There
are two separate responses to this line of reasoning, however.
First, one can easily consider a closely related example where the conformal factor Ω :
M ′ → R goes to zero as the “missing point” q is approached. The resulting spacetime
(M ′,Ω2ηab) is now geodesically incomplete but remains a counterexample to the conjecture.
The second response is of some independent interest: it is not clear that the singularity
theorems are well-motivated in two dimensions. A crucial assumption for all of the major
singularity theorems is the “causal convergence condition,” which is the requirement that
Rabξ
aξb ≥ 0 for all causal vectors ξa (Hawking and Ellis, 1973; Senovilla, 1998). Usually, this
assumption is justified by mentioning that, in four dimensions, it is equivalent to the “strong
energy condition”—the requirement that Tabξ
aξb− 1
2
T ≥ 0 for all unit timelike vectors ξa. It
is often assumed that the strong energy condition is satisfied by all “physically reasonable”
models of the universe (Hawking and Ellis, 1973).17
We close this section by drawing attention to the fact that this equivalence between the
conditions does not hold in two dimensions.
Proposition 7. In two dimensions, the causal convergence condition is not equivalent to
the strong energy condition.
Proof. Let (M, ηab) be two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime where M = R2 and ηab =
∇at∇bt−∇ax∇bx, for standard coordinates (t, x). Let Ω : M → R be the function Ω(t, x) =
17Actually, there are good reasons to be skeptical that the strong energy condition is satisfied in all
physically reasonable spacetimes; see Curiel (2017). Still, it is widely assumed and so its status is of interest
here.
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exp(t2). Consider the spacetime (M, gab) where gab = Ω
2ηab. Because (M, gab) is two-
dimensional, by Prop. 1 above, we know (via Einstein’s equation) that its associated Tab is
the zero tensor. This clearly implies that (M, gab) satisfies the strong energy condition. But,
using the fact that (M, ηab) is flat, one can verify (Wald, 1984, p. 466) that Rab = −2ηab =
−2 exp(−t2)gab where Rab is the Ricci tensor associated with (M, gab). Thus, if ξa is a unit
timelike vector at the point (0, 0) ∈M , we find Rabξaξb there to be −2. Thus, (M, gab) fails
to satisfy the causal convergence condition.
4. No Newtonian Limit
We now consider the relationship between general relativity and Newtonian gravitation in
two dimensions in light of Prop. 1. We begin by reviewing some facts about the sense in
which Newtonian gravitation is a limit of general relativity in four dimensions, and then
show that the same limit does not obtain in two dimensions.
Recall that in four dimensions, one can present Newtonian gravitation as a theory set
in a classical spacetime,18 which is a quadruple (M, ta, h
ab,∇), where M is a connected 4-
manifold of events, ta is a non-vanishing one-form on M , h
ab is a smooth symmetric tensor
field such that for all one-forms τa on M , h
abτb = 0 iff τa = αta for some smooth scalar field
α; and ∇ is a covariant derivative operator on M . We assume that ∇ is compatible with ta
and hab, in the sense that ∇atb = 0 and ∇ahbc = 0. We will say that a vector ξa is timelike
if ξata 6= 0; otherwise it is spacelike; a curve is timelike (resp. spacelike) if its tangent field
is, everywhere.
In this framework, “ordinary” Newtonian gravitation is a theory in which ∇ is flat,
and gravitational effects are described using a gravitational potential ϕ satisfying Poisson’s
equation, ∇a∇aϕ = 4piρ, where ∇aϕ = han∇nϕ and ρ is a scalar field representing the
mass density in spacetime. Given a solution to this equation, small bodies will accelerate
according to the law ξn∇nξa = ∇aϕ, where ξa is the unit tangent to the center-of-mass
worldline of the body. One can also formulate Newtonian gravitation as a “geometrized”
theory, on which spacetime is curved, with Ricci curvature satisfying Rab = 4piρtatb; on this
theory, small bodies follow timelike geodesics.
In four dimensions, there is a precise sense in which the geometrized theory may be
understood as a “classical limit” of general relativity, i.e., a limit in which c → ∞, where
c is the speed of light.19 In particular, suppose we have, on a fixed manifold M , a one-
parameter family λ 7→ gab(λ) of Lorentz-signature metrics, for λ defined on (0, k) ⊆ R with
k ≥ 0, a closed one-form ta, and a smooth tensor field hab, all satisfying the following two
18For details on the formulations of Newtonian gravitation discussed here, see Trautman (1965) and
Malament (2012, Ch. 4).
19For details on the sense in which this limiting procedure captures the idea that the speed of light is
diverging, see Fletcher (2014). Observe that our claim is that any sequence of models of general relativity
satisfying the conditions described in the main text converge to models of Newtonian gravitation, and not
that any model of general relativity has a natural or unique classical analogue, nor that every model of
Newtonian gravitation arises as the limit of a sequence of relativistic spacetimes.
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conditions:20
lim
λ→0
gab(λ) = tatb,
lim
λ→0
λgab = −hab,
where the limit is taken in the so-called C∞ point-open topology.21 Then we have the
following result.
Theorem 8 (Malament (1986)). Let M be a 4-manifold and let gab(λ) be a one-parameter
family of Lorentzian metrics satisfying the following conditions.
1. The family gab(λ) converges to fields tatb and h
ab as just described; and
2. The Einstein tensor Gab(λ) converges to some smooth field T ab.22
Then there exist on M a derivative operator ∇ and a smooth field ρ, such that
1.
λ
∇ → ∇ as λ→ 0;
2. (M, ta, h
ab,∇) is a classical spacetime satisfying Rabcd = Rcdac;
3. Gab(λ)→ ρtatb as λ→ 0; and
4. Rab = 4piρtatb, where Rab is the Ricci tensor determined by ∇.
We now consider the two-dimensional case. As we have characterized it here, one can
certainly make sense of a notion of two-dimensional classical spacetime: one simply defines
the structures described above on a 2-manifold of events rather than a 4-manifold. (Note
that in this case, no analogue to Prop. 1 holds, because the derivative operator ∇ is not
determined by a non-degenerate metric.) To be sure, Newtonian gravitational theory in
this setting has some strange features: for instance, in the non-geometrized theory, the
20In addition, we assume all of the one-parameter families we consider are differentiable, to all orders, in
λ.
21Here we follow Ku¨nzle (1976) and Malament (1986), but one can consider limits taken in other topologies;
see Fletcher (2014) for a discussion; nothing in what follows turns on the difference.
22One might be surprised by this condition. Malament (1986) assumes that there is a one-parameter
family of fields T ab(λ) that converge to some smooth field T ab; and he assumes that Einstein’s equation
holds for each λ, in the form
λ
Rab = 8pi(Tab(λ) − 12
λ
Tgab(λ)), where
λ
T is the trace of T ab(λ) and
λ
Rab is the
Ricci tensor associated with gab(λ). But in four dimensions, these two conditions are equivalent to requiring
that the Einstein tensors determined by gab(λ) converge to some smooth field T
ab. Still, one might think
that we should begin with this alternative formulation of Einstein’s equation, which is only equivalent to
Eq. (2.1) in four dimensions. But as we describe in section 6.2, in two dimensions the alternative version
of Einstein’s equation that Malament considers decouples curvature from energy-momentum, and so there
is no chance that it will yield Poisson’s equation in a classical limit.
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solution to a central force problem, for a point mass located at the origin (in an appropriate
coordinate system (t, x)), yields a (discontinuous) gravitational potential
ϕ =
{
−m
2
x for x > 0,
m
2
x for x < 0,
whose associated gravitational field
∇aϕ =
{
−m
2
xa for x > 0,
m
2
xa for x < 0,
is always attractive, but has magnitude independent of the distance from the central body.23
(Observe that this gravitational potential does not satisfy the boundary condition ϕ→ 0 as
|x| → ∞; moreover, ϕ is generally unique only up to addition of a homogeneous solution to
Poisson’s equation, which in this setting takes the form ϕ = Ax for some constant A, and so
the boundary condition cannot be realized for non-vanishing ϕ.) More generally, the force
between two point masses m and m′ will be given by F a = −mm′ra, where ra is the unit
(spacelike) vector relating them.
But these strange features are not barriers to the theory being mathematically well-
defined; moreover, general relativity is also strange in two (spacetime) dimensions. The
point we want to make now is that these two theories are strange in different, incompatible
ways. Perhaps most strikingly, in geometrized Newtonian gravitation in two dimensions,
one can have matter sources in the geometrized Poisson equation. This is because the Ricci
tensor associated with an arbitrary derivative operator compatible with classical metrics ta
and hab need not vanish—just as the Ricci tensor associated with an arbitrary Lorentzian
metric need not vanish (even though the associated Einstein tensor always does vanish).
This difference between the theories leads us to the striking (further) observations that
in two dimensions it is no longer the case that Newtonian gravitation is a “classical limit”
of GR, at least not in the sense we described above in four dimensions. To see why, suppose
that we have a family of Lorentzian metrics gab(λ) on a 2-manifold, converging to fields
tatb and h
ab as above. It immediately follows, from Prop. 1, that their associated Einstein
tensors also converge—and that they converge to 0. But the Ricci tensor, Rab(λ) associated
to each gab(λ) need not vanish for any λ, and indeed, may not vanish in the limit—even
when the derivative operators associated with gab(λ) converge to a derivative operator ∇
compatible with ta and h
ab.
To make this concrete, consider the manifold R2 with standard coordinates t, x. In units
where c = G = 1, consider the following one-parameter family of metrics:
gab(λ) = dat dbt− λ(1 + t2)dax dbx
23This result is not so unexpected, perhaps: it arises for the same reason that in electrostatics (in three
spatial dimensions), an infinite sheet with uniform charge density gives rise to an electric force that is
independent of the distance from the sheet: it is a consequence of Gauss’s law in one dimension.
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Clearly this family converges pointwise to tatb as λ→ 0, where ta = dat is, by construction,
a closed one-form; likewise we have −λgab(λ) → hab = 1
1+t2
(
∂
∂x
)a ( ∂
∂x
)b
. The derivative
operator associated with gab(λ) for each λ may be written
λ
∇ = (∂, Cabc(λ)), where ∂ is
the coordinate derivative operator and Cabc(λ) =
t
2
λ
(
∂
∂t
)a
dbx dcx +
2t
1+t2
(
∂
∂x
)a
d(bx dc)t;
this has associated Ricci tensor Rab(λ) =
1
2
Rgab(λ), where R = − 2(1+t2)2 has no dependence
on λ. One can easily confirm, then, that
λ
∇ → ∇ = (∂, 2t
1+t2
(
∂
∂x
)a
d(bx dc)t), satisfying
Rab
c
d = R
c
d
a
b; and that Rab(λ) → 12Rtatb. It follows that (R2, ta, hab,∇) is a classical
spacetime, but with matter source ρ = 1
8pi
R 6= 0, even though for every λ > 0, (M, gab(λ))
is a vacuum spacetime. It is in this sense that (geometrized) Newtonian gravitation is not
the classical limit of general relativity in two dimensions: the limit does not preserve both
sides of Einstein’s equation.24
In summary, we have proved the following result. (Compare with Theorem 8.)
Proposition 9. There exists a 2-manifold M and a one-parameter family gab(λ) of Lorentzian
metrics on M satisfying the following conditions:
1. The family gab(λ) converges to fields tatb and h
ab as just described; and
2. The Einstein tensor Gab(λ) converges to some smooth field T ab.
Moreover, there exist on M a derivative operator ∇ and a smooth field ρ, such that
1.
λ
∇ → ∇ as λ→ 0;
2. (M, ta, h
ab,∇) is a classical spacetime satisfying Rabcd = Rcdab; and
3. Rab = 4piρtatb, where Rab is the Ricci tensor determined by ∇.
But it is nonetheless not the case that Gab(λ)→ ρtatb as λ→ 0.
5. Non-Zero Cosmological Constant and Matter
Thus far, we have considered a generalization of general relativity to two dimensions based on
the assumption that Eq. (2.1) holds. We have thus ignored the possibility of a cosmological
constant term Λgab appearing in Einstein’s equation. We now consider what happens if we
do include this term. In other words, we now suppose that the equation
Rab − 1
2
gabR− Λgab = 8piTab (5.1)
24In this example, the value of ρ achieved in the limit is everywhere negative. But this does not hold in
all such examples—consider instead the family of metrics gab(λ) = dat dbt − t dax dbx defined on R2 for
t > 0, for which we find, in the limit, R = 12t2 > 0, yielding positive ρ.
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holds in two dimensions, where T ab is understood once again to be the total energy-momentum
density associated with matter and Λ 6= 0 is taken to be a constant of nature—i.e., it is a
quantity that takes the same (unspecified) value at every spacetime point, and in all models
of the theory.25 (Observe the sign of the Λ term in Eq. (5.1), which arises because of our
metric signature convention.)
The first thing to observe about this case is that Prop. 1 continues to hold. But it no
longer implies that all spacetimes are vacuum solutions; instead, Eq. (5.1) simplifies in two
dimensions to
− Λ
8pi
gab = Tab. (5.2)
Thus, if Λ 6= 0 we have a (non-degenerate) field equation relating the spacetime metric to
energy-momentum.
Since Λ is a constant with some fixed value, Eq. (5.2) asserts that the energy-momentum
tensor associated with matter is always some (fixed) multiple of the metric gab. This in turn
implies that T ab is (necessarily) non-vanishing, which means that no spacetimes are vacuum
spacetimes, and indeed, T ab is nowhere vanishing. It follows from this observation that one
can have matter, but not (isolated) bodies. It also implies that T ab is always constant, since
∇a(Λgbc) = 0; that T = −Λ/4pi, where T is the trace of T ab; and that Tab = 12Tgab.
Given these strong constraints on energy-momentum in two dimensions, one might won-
der if there are any candidate matter fields whose stress-energies can satisfy them. Indeed,
perhaps as one would expect, for some standard systems of equations, there are no non-
trivial solutions compatible with Eq. (5.2) in two dimensions. For instance, one can consider
solutions to the Einstein-Klein-Gordon equations, where the Einstein equation is understood
as Eq. (5.2) and the Klein-Gordon equation has the same form as in four dimensions:
∇a∇aϕ+m2ϕ = 0, (5.3)
with the associated energy-momentum tensor given by
T ab = ∇aϕ∇bϕ− 1
2
gab(∇nϕ∇nϕ−m2ϕ2).
Taking the trace of both sides yields T = m2ϕ2, which can be constant only if ϕ is constant.
But if ϕ is constant, then by Eq. (5.3), m2ϕ = 0, and thus either m = 0 or ϕ = 0. In either
case, we find T = 0, which is incompatible with Eq. (5.2) for Λ 6= 0. (On the other hand,
it seems that the m = 0 Klein-Gordon equation admits constant, non-vanishing solutions
whose energy-momentum tensor vanishes identically, and which thus solve the Einstein-
25Here we follow Earman (2003, p. 561), who distinguishes “two senses in which the cosmological constant
can be a constant: the capital Λ sense, according to which Λ is a universal constant, and the lower case
λ sense, according to which λ is the same throughout spacetime but can have different values in different
universes”, and then argues that it is the capital Λ sense that is taken for granted in standard approaches
to deriving Eq. (5.1) from an action principle. See also Bianchi and Rovelli (2010). We do not take a stand
on whether one should think of Λ in this way, i.e., as a constant of nature, or perhaps as something that
can vary from model to model, as in unimodular gravity.
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Klein-Gordon equations in two dimensions without cosmological constant.)
Still, it turns out that at least some matter fields with non-vanishing energy-momentum
tensors can be defined in two dimensions. Consider the case of electromagnetism with a
perfect fluid source, assuming that analogs of the Maxwell equations for the Faraday (field
strength) tensor Fab and charge-current density J
a in four dimensions hold in two:
∇[aFbc] = 0, (5.4)
∇aF ab = J b. (5.5)
Further suppose that the energy-momentum tensor associated with Fab in two dimensions
is also the analog of its expression in four, and similarly for the energy-momentum tensor
associated with the charged fluid:
EM
Tab = FamF
m
b +
1
4
gab(FmnF
mn), (5.6)
PF
Tab = ρηaηb − p(gab − ηaηb), (5.7)
where ηa is the four-velocity field of the fluid and ρ and p are its scalar mass-energy density
and pressure, respectively. (We assume, for simplicity, that the four-velocity field ηa is
defined [and non-zero] everywhere.)
It will be convenient to express the metric and the Faraday tensor in terms of ηa. In
particular, at least locally we can express
gab = ηaηb − χaχb (5.8)
for a unit spacelike field χa orthogonal to ηa, which in two dimensions is unique up to a
choice of sign. This determines a volume element
ab = 2η[aχb], (5.9)
which is the unique 2-form on the manifold up to a multiplicative scalar field. So, one can
express the Faraday tensor Fab, which is anti-symmetric, as
Fab = fab = 2fη[aχb], (5.10)
where f is a scalar field on M . Note in particular that
FamF
m
b = (fam)(f
m
b) = f
2(ηaχm − χaηm)(ηmχb − χmηb)
= f 2(ηaηb − χaχb) = f 2gab, (5.11)
FmnF
mn = −2f 2. (5.12)
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Using these two facts, we can express the total energy-momentum tensor Tab =
EM
Tab +
PF
Tab as
Tab = FamF
m
b +
1
4
gab(FmnF
mn) + ρηaηb − p(gab − ηaηb)
= f 2(ηaηb − χaχb)− 1
2
f 2(ηaηb − χaχb) + ρηaηb + pχaχb
=
(
ρ+
1
2
f 2
)
ηaηb +
(
p− 1
2
f 2
)
χaχb.
Equating this with the expression for the energy-momentum given by Einstein’s equation,
Tab = −(Λ/8pi)gab = −(Λ/8pi)(ηaηb − χaχb), yields the following two equations in three
variables (ρ, p, f 2):
ρ = −1
2
f 2 − Λ
8pi
, (5.13)
p =
1
2
f 2 +
Λ
8pi
. (5.14)
Thus the energy density and pressure of the fluid are critically balanced (p = −ρ) and are
quadratic in the “magnitude” of the Faraday tensor, offset by the cosmological constant.
There are a few special cases to note.
Λ = 0: When the cosmological constant vanishes, so does the energy-momentum tensor.
Contrary to expectation (cf. Collas (1977)), it is possible to have non-vanishing matter
fields even when the total energy-momentum tensor vanishes, because it is possible for
the contributions from the electromagnetic field and the perfect fluid to cancel each
other exactly. That said, in this case we have negative mass density and p = −ρ, which
implies that the energy-momentum tensor associated with the perfect fluid does not
satisfy the weak energy condition. (Compare this case with the discussion of scalar
fields above.)
f 2 = 0: Without electromagnetic fields, the energy density and pressure must be everywhere
constant and balanced exactly by the cosmological constant: ρ = −p = −Λ/8pi, and
ρ > 0 implies that Λ < 0.
p = 0: If pressure vanishes, we must have f 2 = −Λ/4pi, which implies that ρ = 0 (and
Λ < 0). Therefore dust (whether charged or not) is impossible in two dimensions. In
this case, since f is constant, Maxwell’s equations imply that J b = 0, yet any observer
with four-velocity ξa at a point measures a constant electric field Ea = F abξ
b = fσa,
where σa is a spacelike unit vector orthogonal to ξa. (The magnetic field is undefined.)
In such a model, charged test particles are a bit like Rindler observers in special
relativity: they accelerate at a constant rate forever.
This example shows that there are some cases in which matter fields may be defined
in two dimensions, both when Λ 6= 0 and otherwise. But as we will now argue, even if
17
we do have matter, the relationship between matter and geometry in two dimensions is
strikingly different from in four dimensions. In particular, there is a sense in which matter
in two dimensions does not (necessarily) “gravitate”. To see this, fix any flat metric ηab
on a two-dimensional manifold M (admitting some flat metric). It follows that this metric
is a solution to Eq. (5.2), for Tab = −(Λ/8pi)ηab 6= 0. Thus, the presence of matter does
not imply that the spacetime has non-vanishing Ricci curvature or non-vanishing curvature
scalar. Contrast this result with the standard claim in four dimensions that, if T ab satisfies
the strong energy condition (discussed in section 3) then gravity is attractive, in the sense
that nearby geodesics tend to converge. In two dimensions, T ab may satisfy any energy
condition at all, while the “geodesic deviation” of the spacetime, measuring the degree to
which nearby geodesics accelerate relative to one another, vanishes identically (cf. Malament,
2012, §2.7).
Before moving on, we note that the discussion of this section, concerning matter in two
dimensions when Λ 6= 0, may strike some readers as very strange. After all, although matter
may be defined, its dynamics is so constrained as to barely deserve the name. Moreover,
although matter is (necessarily) present, as a consequence of Eq. (5.2), the relationship
between matter and geometry is much weaker than in four dimensions. One might conclude
from this discussion that a non-zero cosmological constant in two dimensions is unphysical,
and so one ought to conclude that Λ must be 0 in two dimensions. (Of course, one might
equally argue that even the Λ = 0 case is unphysical. But it seems to us that a theory with
a large number of vacuum solutions is physically significant in a way that a theory with no
vacuum solutions and necessary, unphysical matter is not.)
But if one finds this argument compelling, it has the following consequence. We arrived at
Eq. (5.2) by supposing that the correct form of Einstein’s equation, irrespective of dimension,
is given by Eq. (5.1), for some (fixed) value of Λ 6= 0. But from this perspective, the
assignment of a value to Λ is independent of the choice of dimensionality of the spacetime
manifold. This means that, if Λ must be 0 in some subset of the permissible models in the
theory, then Λ must be 0 in every case, independent of the dimensionality of any of the
particular models.
Of course, there are ways to respond to this argument without accepting the conclusion.
For instance, one could deny the premise with which we began this section, that the cosmo-
logical constant should be taken to have the same value in all models of the theory. Perhaps
one could allow it to vary generally; or one could imagine it is the same in all models of
a given dimension, but varies between dimensions. One could also argue along the lines of
what we will present in section 6.2, that one should not generalize general relativity to two
dimensions by assuming Einstein’s equation holds, with or without cosmological constant.
But any of these responses raises new questions concerning how we are to determine what
can and cannot vary when one considers the space of possibilities according to a theory. One
principled answer, which we have adopted here for the sake of argument, is that constants of
nature never vary across models; other answers are possible, but presumably require defense.
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6. On the Choice of Generalizing General Relativity via Einstein’s Equation
The laundry list of unusual features of the version(s) of general relativity in two dimensions
that we have been considering draw attention to the assumption with which we began, that
Einstein’s equation in two dimensions is the same as in four dimensions. But should we
accept that assumption? Why should the two-dimensional equation have the same syntactic
form as the four-dimensional equation? What kind of inductive evidence could we have to
secure such an inference?
One line of evidence comes from various theoretical results establishing conditions un-
der which the Einstein equation (or perhaps a class of equations including it) is uniquely
determined as the field equation connecting geometry and matter in a spacetime theory.
We review the bearing of these on two-dimensional gravity in section 6.1. These theorems
have assumptions that could be questioned, of course, so in section 6.2 we describe how
their conclusions could be and have been evaded. Some of the alternative field equations
proposed are justified in entirely different ways. Finally, in section 6.3, we consider how any
of these proposals could makes contact with our empirical evidence for the four-dimensional
theory, raising the possibility of a plurality of viable two-dimensional theories.
6.1. Lovelock Variations
Why ought the Einstein equation be the appropriate field equation for general relativity even
in four dimensions? There is a long history of attempts to provide an axiomatic or principled
justification beyond Einstein’s heuristic reasoning. These approaches have generally been
founded on the following assumptions:26
1. The field equation must take the form
G˜ab(g) = Tab, (6.1)
where Tab is the usual energy-momentum tensor field (although not necessarily assumed
to be symmetric) and G˜ab is some (0,2)-tensor field whose value at a point depends
only on the metric and its derivatives at that point.
2. The conservation condition holds, i.e., in light of the first condition, ∇aG˜ab(g) = 0.
The first condition ensures that the field equation is defined pointwise by the metric gab and
its derivatives, and that it equates the “marble” of geometry with the “wood” of matter.
The second condition demands that the conservation condition follows from the form of G˜ab
alone. Together, they do not imply that G˜ab ∝ Gab−Λgab, but with a few extra conditions,
they do (Vermeil, 1917; Cartan, 1922; Weyl, 1922):
3. G˜ab(g) depends only on the metric gab and its first and second derivatives.
26See Misner et al. (1973, §17.5) for a discussion of these approaches pre-Lovelock and some other, more
heuristic approaches to determining the Einstein equation.
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4. G˜ab(g) is linear in the second derivatives of the metric gab.
5. G˜ab(g) is symmetric.
Note that there is no assumption concerning the dimensionality of spacetime. One can
maintain the same conclusion, however, by dropping conditions 4 and 5 and adding such an
assumption:
6. Spacetime is four-dimensional.
This celebrated result, due to Lovelock (1971, 1972), is often quoted as one of the strongest
foundations for the Einstein equation in four dimensions, yet it can be applied to two
dimensions as well. For, Lovelock (1971) provides a general form for tensor fields G˜ab(g)
satisfying conditions 1–3 and 5 that yields a unique answer in the two-dimensional case,
too:27
G˜ab(g) = Agab, (6.2)
for some constant A ∈ R. Recently Navarro (2014) has shown how to achieve the same
conclusions without condition 5, so we may state the most general conclusion about two-
dimensional general relativity thus:
Proposition 10. Any divergence-free tensor field G˜ab in two dimensions naturally definable
pointwise from the metric gab and its first and second derivatives must take the form of
Eq. (6.2).
A variation on Lovelock’s approach, first described by Aldersley (1977) and elaborated
by Navarro and Sancho (2008), drops condition 3 for the following “dimensional analysis”
condition:
7. G˜ab(g) is independent of the unit of scale, i.e., for any λ > 0, G˜ab(λ
2g) = G˜ab(g).
In other words, condition 7 states the invariance of G˜ab under homothetic transformations
of the metric. In fact, this assumption proves a conclusion somewhat stronger:
Proposition 11. Any divergence-free tensor field G˜ab in two dimensions naturally definable
pointwise from the metric gab and its derivatives must take the form G˜ab = AGab(= 0).
Thus, condition 7 rules out the cosmological constant term from appearing in the “mar-
ble” geometry of the field equation. Does this imply that the proposition’s assumptions
are in conflict with the observed non-zero value of Λ? Both Aldersley (1977) and Navarro
and Sancho (2008) counsel that it does not insofar as it forces one to place that term on
the right-hand side of Eq. (6.1), strongly suggesting that Λ be interpreted as a material
contribution to the equation rather than a geometrical one. This counsel applies equally in
two dimensions as it does in four.
27See also Navarro and Navarro (2011) for a simplified proof connecting these results with the geometric
concept of natural tensor fields.
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The strength of this result clearly depends on condition 7; how should we interpret it?
A homothetic transformation gab 7→ λ2gab, it is often said, “amounts to a change in the time
unit,” so that condition 7 means that G˜ab (hence Tab) is “independent of [the choice of] the
time unit” (Navarro and Sancho, 2008, §6), but such an interpretation must be handled with
care. While it is true that a homothetic transformation effectively multiplies the lengths
of all timelike curves by a constant factor, the resulting spacetime may not necessarily be
interpreted as simply the same as before but with different units. This can occur if the
equations relating fields on the spacetime contain dimensional (i.e., not purely numerical)
constants that set an absolute scale for dimensional quantities (Aldersley, 1977, pp. 372–
3). Thus a better description of condition 7 is that the field equation is temporally (and,
from the constancy of the speed of light, spatially) scale invariant: changes of temporal
(or spatial) scale are dynamical symmetries in the sense that they leave the field equation
invariant.
In light of this, it is easy to see how the inclusion of the cosmological constant term
breaks this symmetry, as a non-zero value thereof introduces a time (and therefore length)
scale into the theory. This is distinct from Newtonian gravitation, which does not have
any such absolute scale. It must be remarked, however, that it is difficult to see how scale
invariance could be an a priori condition on a theory of gravitation. Whether it holds seems
rather to be an empirical matter.28
6.2. Alternative Field Equations
What the approaches described in section 6.1 all have in common are the first two conditions:
the form of the field equation (6.1) and the conservation condition. It is not difficult to
find arguments for the conservation condition (e.g., see Misner et al. (1973, §17.2)). Yet the
assumption that the connection between geometry and matter must take the form prescribed
in Eq. (6.1) is hardly ever questioned explicitly in the literature. Why should the relationship
between geometry and matter be so simply expressed?
For instance, in four dimensions the usual form of Einstein’s equation is equivalent to
Rab = 8pi
(
Tab − 1
2
gabT
)
− Λgab, (6.3)
where T = T aa is the trace of the energy-momentum tensor. To show this, beginning with
either equation, one can take the trace of both sides to establish that R = −8piT − 4Λ, and
substituting R for T (or vice versa) in the relevant place in the equation. But this argument
involves taking the trace of the metric, the value of which is the dimensionality of spacetime,
so the equivalence depends on the assumption that spacetime is four-dimensional. In any
28This is not to say that it is an implausible assumption. If one believes, in some sense, geometry to
be prior to matter, one might argue that the introduction of an absolute length or time scale arises only
through the peculiar particularities of specific types of matter, so that in fact G˜ab should be scale invariant.
However, it is still hard to see how this argument establishes anything more than the plausibility of condition
7.
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other dimension, including two, it does not hold.
Consequently, one could instead take the form given in Eq. (6.3), instead of the usual
form, to be the field equation connecting geometry and matter in two dimensions. But in
this case, Prop. 1 still holds, so we have that
1
2
Rgab = 8pi
(
Tab − 1
2
gabT
)
− Λgab,
whose trace yields that R = −2Λ. Thus, this alternative version of Einstein’s equation
would lead us to conclude that
Tab =
1
2
Tgab. (6.4)
In this theory, curvature and matter play roles converse from those reached by beginning with
the other form of Einstein’s equation: instead of the Ricci tensor being proportional to its
trace times the metric and the energy-momentum proportional to the cosmological constant
times the metric, the energy-momentum is proportional to its trace times the metric and the
Ricci tensor is proportional to the cosmological constant times the metric. In other words,
this equation yields a universe of constant curvature whose geometry is totally decoupled
from the energy of ponderable matter.
Unlike with the usual form of Einstein’s equation, Eq. (6.3) does not guarantee that the
conservation condition ∇aT ab = 0 holds (except in four dimensions). If one adds this as
a separate field equation, then from Eq. (6.4) one immediately derives that ∇aT = 0, i.e.,
T must be constant. Thus the conservation condition forces the energy-momentum to take
the same form as before, except the role played by the cosmological constant is now played
by the (constant) trace of the energy-momentum. In a sense, the resulting theory allows
for strictly fewer possibilities than before: with the analog of the original form of Einstein’s
equation, solutions were parameterized by a single real scalar field (the scalar curvature R),
whereas with Eq. (6.3) and the conservation condition, they are parameterized by a real
number (the trace T of the energy-momentum).29
Is there a different field equation that escapes the form (6.1) and yet provides possibilities
that seem more physically reasonable than the ones considered above in two dimensions? In
fact, the very considerations arising from Prop. 1—on the one hand, the lack of constraint on
geometry, and on the other, the severe constraint on matter30—have led physicists, starting
with Teitelboim (1983, 1984) and Jackiw (1984, 1985), to propose instead the field equa-
29If one allows Λ to vary between models, then in both cases one also may parameterize models by values
of the cosmological constant. But that is a real number in both cases, and so it does not change the analysis.
30An historical aside: as Wald (1984, p. 72) notes, Einstein came to reject an earlier field equation in
which Tab ∝ Rab precisely because it demanded that both R and T are constant.
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tions31
R− Λ = 8piT, (6.5)
∇aT ab = 0. (6.6)
Notably, the conservation condition is assumed separately from the field equation, which,
though it equates geometry with energy-momentum, does so through scalar quantities in-
stead of (0,2)-tensors. Unlike higher-dimensional cases, however, in which this would under-
determine both geometric and matter degrees of freedom, in two dimensions the only degree
of freedom in the geometry comes through the scalar curvature.
Eq. (6.5) is not obviously syntactically related to Einstein’s equation in four dimensions.
Indeed, as Boozer (2008, p. 320) points out, the field equations are analogous to those of
Nordstro¨m’s 1913 theory (Misner et al., 1973, p. 429),
R = 24piT,
Cabcd = 0,
since, as we argued before, the only candidates for the Weyl tensor Cabcd in two dimensions
must vanish. What would make Einstein’s theory in two dimensions essentially the same as
a clearly distinct theory in four?
One can adduce three sorts of arguments. The first and most commonly argued position
is that the qualitative similarities between the solutions of Eqs. (6.5) and (6.6) and the four-
dimensional Einsteinian theory are the relevant factors for comparison, not the language in
which the equations are described. Such claimed features include (Christensen and Mann,
1992):
• being derivable from a local action principle,
• a Newtonian limit,
• Robertson-Walker cosmological solutions,
• gravitational waves, and
• the gravitational collapse of dust into a black hole with an event horizon analogous to
that of the four-dimensional Schwarzschild solution.
Hence, this theory’s advocates have (if only implicitly) suggested that it is not the syntactic
features of the field equation but qualitative semantic features—those of its models—that
31Caution: there is some variation in the literature on the choice of numerical coefficients and whether to
exclude the cosmological constant or matter. The presentation here essentially follows that of Christensen
and Mann (1992).
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provide evidence that it is a relevant analog of general relativity in two dimensions.32 But
this evidence does not extend to any claim of uniqueness.
We have found further two arguments in the literature for some sort of uniqueness, but
neither is conclusive. The first, as developed by Mann (1992), begins by pointing out that
the usual Einstein equation in n dimensions is equivalent to the following two equations,
representing its trace and trace-free parts, respectively:(
1− n
2
)
R = 8piGnT, (6.7)
Rab − 1
n
Rgab = 8piGn
(
Tab − 1
n
Tgab
)
, (6.8)
where Newton’s constant Gn is now assumed to depend on n. In particular, if one assumes
that Gn/(1−n/2) is well-defined, non-zero, and n can be treated as a continuous parameter,
then one can define
G′2 = lim
n→2
Gn
1− n/2 (6.9)
as a kind of “renormalized” gravitational constant. In this case the trace equation yields
(the cosomological constant-free version of) Eq. (6.2), and the trace-free equation becomes
a mathematical identity.
The difficulty with this argument, aside from the mathematically dubious treatment of
n as a continuous parameter, is that it is not obvious how to justify that Newton’s constant
should depend on dimensionality, much less in precisely the way that makes G′2 well-defined
and non-zero. If this dependence is not of a very particular form then one could well arrive
at different field equations.33
The second argument, described by Lemos and Sa´ (1994), also proposes to derive Eq. (6.5)
from a limiting procedure. Their argument is that because there is a case for general rela-
tivity to be a limiting case of Brans-Dicke theory in dimensions greater than two, whatever
theory results from the same limit for two-dimensional Brans-Dicke theory ought to be con-
sidered the two-dimensional analog of GR. Brans-Dicke theory is an alternative gravitational
theory involving a scalar field φ, interpreted as a kind of variable gravitational constant, and
a new dimensionless constant, the Brans-Dicke constant ω, which mediates the strength of
the coupling between the variability of φ and matter.34 There are arguments to the ef-
fect that taking ω → ∞ results in GR, and Lemos and Sa´ (1994) suggest to extend this
32Boozer (2008) provides two “derivations” of the theory, one from a two-dimensional Newtonian theory
and another using a “principle of equivalence” argument assuming that gravitation is represented by a scalar
field. The former shows a sense in which Eq. (6.5) is a relativistic analog of the two-dimensional Poisson
equation, while the latter results only in an “effective” geometry overlaid on an undetectable Minkowski
background. These are fine as heuristic or motivational arguments, but because of the many assumptions
and unforced choices made in the course of their development, they do not provide, in our opinion, evidence
beyond those of the qualitative features already established.
33Note, too, that one would need to take a constant of nature—Newton’s constant—to vary with dimen-
sion. Compare with the discussion at the end of section 5.
34Specifically, φ = [8pi/(3 + 2ω)]T , where  is the Laplace-Beltrami operator.
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inductively to the two-dimensional case.
However, to achieve this result, the authors must assume that the “effective” field φ,
cosmological constant Λ′, and energy-momentum trace T ′ are actually functions of ω of the
following forms:
φ = φ0 +
ϕ
4ω
+O(ω−2), (6.10)
Λ′ = Λ0 +
Λ
2ω
+O(ω−2), (6.11)
T ′ = T0 − T
4e2φ0ω
+O(ω−2), (6.12)
where φ0,Λ0, T0 are real constants and ϕ is a scalar field.
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Clearly some of the difficulties with this argument are similar to those for the argument
described by Mann (1992). As before, it is difficult to see why the “renormalized” field
T ′ and parameter Λ′ should depend on ω in the way they must to arrive at the desired
conclusion. These dependencies can be easily changed to arrive at different field equations.
(Unlike in typical applications of running constants or effective fields depending on, say,
the energy scale, the parameter ω is constant: it cannot vary from context to context in a
model.) Moreover, the security of the premises that the ω →∞ limit of Brans-Dicke should
be always identified as GR, regardless of dimension, presumes dubiously that our evidence
for the correct form of that theory is better than for GR. Finally, besides questioning the
cogency of the result in general on conceptual or mathematical grounds (Faraoni, 1999;
Bhadra and Nandi, 2001; Chauvineau, 2003), one simply is not logically compelled to accept
the inference from the n ≥ 3 case to the n = 2 case.
6.3. The Empirical Content of Low-Dimensional Gravity
The previous subsections described a few different approaches to justifying what, exactly,
the field equation(s) in two-dimensional general relativity ought to be. But we have argued
that none of the arguments for uniqueness succeed without questionable premises, and so
the question of what, exactly, two-dimensional general relativity is supposed to be seems
not yet to have a conclusive answer. If there is any theory which deserves to be called the
two-dimensional version of GR, there needs to be a principled way in which that theory is
supported. Are there other considerations that might be brought to bear?
As suggested at the beginning of this section, one might try to determine the relevant
field equation, or at least constraints on what it could be, through the empirical evidence
we have for four-dimensional GR. What relationship, though, does evidence for the four-
dimensional theory have with a two-dimensional theory? Since it is less obviously tasked
with accurate or otherwise successful description, to what criteria must a two-dimensional
theory be held? Such questions are, perhaps surprisingly, rarely addressed in the literature
on two-dimensional gravity. One exception is Jackiw (1985), who concedes that study of
35We have adjusted the notation somewhat to align it with that used so far.
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two-dimensional gravity probably has only pedagogical value. His primary interest in low-
dimensional gravity, in other words, is as a toy model for the real case of interest, four
(or higher) dimensions, in which various calculations and ideas (especially pertaining to
quantization) can proceed less encumbered from the complexities that more dimensions
introduce.36 Such strategies, after all, have been successful for other branches of study,
such as condensed matter physics. Consequently, if one has those sorts of goals in mind
in investigating two-dimensional gravity, then the qualitative features of the solutions to
Eq. (6.5) would override considerations coming from Lovelock’s theorem and its variants.
Jackiw (1985, p. 344) does consider two further possibilities, which are that lower-
dimensional theories could have a kind of duality with higher-dimensional theory, and that
lower-dimensional theories could describe the behavior of configurations of matter in four
dimensions that are confined to move in fewer dimensions. He dismisses them as either
physically nonsensical or speculative, but this seems too quick to us. Falling within the
former sort of case, at least considered broadly, are situations in which the symmetries of
a spacetime reduce the degrees of freedom to those of a two-dimensional model.37 Falling
within the latter are models in which matter is (at least as a sufficiently good idealization)
confined to an embedded two-dimensional Lorentzian submanifold. In either case, evidence
for the two-dimensional theory could be inherited from evidence for four-dimensional GR,
simply because the two-dimensional theory describes a part of a world like ours.
One difference, however, is that there is no guarantee in these cases that there be a
single two-dimensional theory that deserves to be called the rightful analog of GR. Indeed,
perhaps we must be prepared to admit that multiple theories of two-dimensional general
relativity may be viable. This plurality of theories need not be problematic, however, as
it would be if there were no good reasons to pick amongst the different versions yielding
conflicting descriptions of phenomena. Rather, different two-dimensional theories could
apply in different contexts, depending on how that context is related to the more familiar
four-dimensional theory for which we have more direct empirical evidence.38 A thorough
investigation of what these theories can be, and the contexts in which they arise, must be
left to future research.
7. Conclusion
We have described various features of general relativity in two dimensions, on several differ-
ent ways of understanding what that theory should consist in. As we have argued, general
36For more on the use of toy models in physics, see Hartmann (1995), Marzuoli (2008), Luczak (2017),
and Reutlinger et al. (2017).
37The literature on dimensional reduction is voluminous, not least because of the polysemy of the term.
For a small sample of the literature on the sense in which it is used here, see Cadoni and Mignemi (1995),
Kiem and Park (1996), and Schmidt (1999). For a comparison with the method of Mann (1992) discussed
above, see Mann and Ross (1993).
38See, however, Fletcher (2017) for arguments for the same pluralistic conclusion for four-dimensional GR.
If distinct versions of four-dimensional general relativity are confirmed, the various two-dimensional theories
derived from them through dimensional reduction could also be confirmed. In this sense, a plurality of
four-dimensional theories does not undermine the empirical basis for a plurality of two-dimensional theories.
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relativity in two dimensions is strikingly different from the theory in four dimensions. On
one natural way of understanding the two-dimensional theory, several of the characteristic
features of the four-dimensional theory—such as the existence of an initial-value formu-
lation, a well-defined Newtonian limit, and a dynamical dependence of spacetime on the
presence of matter—do not appear to hold in two dimensions. Alternative versions of the
two-dimensional theory, meanwhile, eschew Einstein’s equation. Given this, it seems one
needs to either qualify one’s assertions concerning the features of general relativity, or else
conclude that there is some sense in which general relativity requires spacetime to have four
dimensions (or at least, have dimension greater than two). As we argue in section 5, if one
adopts the first option, there are consequences for what value the cosmological constant can
take—at least if one adopts the view that the cosmological constant is a constant of nature,
in the sense described by Earman (2003).
We conclude by observing that the sort of extended reflection on a physical theory in
other dimensions as presented here—which, we emphasize, is hardly unusual in the physics
literature—raises important questions for philosophers of physics (and others) concerning
how we understand the space of physical possibilities. Briefly, many philosophers of physics
would like to take the space of models of our physical theories as characterizing a space of
“physically possible worlds” (Ruetsche, 2011, Ch. 2). We do not wish to take a stand on
whether this is the best way of understanding the notion of possibility captured by physical
theorizing. But if one does think this way, then it seems that there is a certain indeterminacy
in what this space of possibilities consists in.
In particular, either it is possible that the world had a different number of dimensions
than we observe, or not. In the former case, the space of physically possible worlds pre-
sumably includes worlds with different numbers of dimensions. But then, one might think
that there must be some fact about the laws in those worlds. Can we know what the laws
are? Should we be committed to the idea that the laws in other dimensions take the same
form as in four dimensions, or should other considerations, such as we discuss in section 6,
enter into our deliberations? Do constants of nature vary among these possibilities, and if
so, do they vary only when one changes dimension? Should we be satisfied if, having chosen
some way of generalizing some theory, the possibilities in other dimensions turn out to be
qualitatively different from those in four dimensions?
In the latter case, meanwhile, where it is not possible for the world to have been two-
dimensional, it seems that there can be no fact of the matter about whether analyses of mod-
els with other dimensions (as happens in both quantum gravity and mathematical quantum
field theory) track anything about the world at all, because there are no physical possibilities
to which these models correspond.
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